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Abstract:  Factors  that  affect  agribusiness  firms’  investment  decision  on  new  Precision 
agriculture technique are identified and the real option model is used to derive both the lead 
and follow-on investment threshold. Results show that compared to the market demand 
uncertainty and new technique arrival uncertainty and noise in the new market, decreasing 
in initial irreversible capital cost of precision agriculture service has the most significant 
effect on bringing down the threshold level for both the leader and the follower.   
 














 Section one: introduction and previous research 
Precision  Agriculture  (PA)  refers  to  a  suite  of  technologies  that  use  sensing  and 
geo-referencing innovations to apply inputs more precisely based on a field's biophysical 
variability.    It  promises  more  efficient  input  usage,  higher  profit  and  superior 
environmental benefits. 
 
PA technologies can be divided into two categories:   
(1) Diagnostic  techniques:  are  methods  for  gathering  information  and  analyzing  spatial 
variability  among  the  soil  and  plant  characteristics.  They  include  remote  sensing, 
topsoil thickness, yield monitor and grid soil sampling techniques.   
(2) Application  techniques:  use  computer-controlled  devices  to  vary  inputs  such  as 
fertilizers, pesticides, seeding and liming by using the field maps. 
 
Two major steps will be performed in adoption of precision agriculture. Usually, diagnostic 
techniques are first used to assessing the variability and then application techniques are 
applied to manage variability that is assessed from first step. 
 
The major factors influencing farmer’s adoption of PA technique are farm size, the costs of 
adoption,  value  and  cost  of  product,  scale  economies,  financial  situation,  location  and 
human capital.    Since high capital PA techniques are relatively expensive and technically 
complicated for small farms, it provides agribusiness firms with a business opportunity to invest in high capital PA techniques and profit from renting the PA techniques to the small 
farms,  and  therefore  these  firms  become  key  drivers  in  PA  technique  adoption  in  U.S 
agricultural production. 
 
However, USDA data shows that agribusiness firms put their heaviest investment in low 
capital PA methods. 2006 USDA survey shows that only one third of the agribusiness 
dealers provide “high tech” services, including Multi-nutrient variable rate application, 
satellite/aerial imagery and/or variable seeding with GPS, which are more expense in their 
initial investment. The rest mostly provide “low tech” or “Site-specific with no technology” 
service. Forty-seven percent of the agribusiness dealer in 2006 survey also shows that they 
profit from providing “high tech” service. 
 
Here  comes  the  conundrum.  High  tech/high  expense  precision  agriculture  equipment 
promise better profit. The adoption rate for the agribusiness firms is comparatively low. The 
reason  has  multiple  dimensions.  Given  the  uncertain  demand  for  new  high  capital  PA 
methods, agribusiness firms always enter into this market with the smallest capital outlay.   
When they need to make high capital PA technology investments, they face two major 
uncertainties:  future  demand  uncertainty  from  farmers  (consequently  future  cash  flow 
uncertainty) and new technique arrival uncertainty (which makes the current investment 
obsolete).    Besides these two uncertainties, the first  mover in this  market will face an 
unobservable demand associated with the brand new PA service, which means the demand level can only be estimated with noise.    In addition, the initial investment cost of the high 
capital PA technique is huge and irreversible due to the specific use of the PA equipment.   
It is all these uncertainties and noise, as well as the irreversible nature associated with the 
high capital PA technique investment, that makes waiting for more information valuable 
and therefore causes the agribusiness firms to delay their investment. 
 
Since agribusiness firms are the key drivers of high capital PA techniques, the threshold and 
timing of their investment for high capital PA methods becomes an interesting question for 
policy maker.    Thus valid economic analysis and model of their investment behavior is 
needed. 
 
This study seeks to identify the underlying reasons that cause the slow adoption rate of high 
capital  Precision  Agriculture  (PA)  technique  of  agribusiness  firms  and  to  examine  the 
potential policy strategies to improve the situation.    The specific objectives include: (1) to 
identify  two  uncertainties  associated  with  high  capital  PA  technique  investments  for 
agribusiness firms: demand uncertainty from farmers and new technique arrival uncertainty;   
(2) to identify the noise associated with the unobservable demand level for a new high 
capital PA service by farmers;    (3) to develop a real option model that incorporates the two 
uncertainties  and  noise,  and  examine  how  these  factors  affect  agribusiness  firms’ 
investment threshold, and which will play different roles (leader, follower) in the market;   
(4) to suggest three agricultural policy alternatives that can improve the current situation.  
This paper is organized as follows. The current section briefly reviews the existing studies 
of precision agriculture techniques adoption problem. In section 2, we describe the model 
that is based on the previous research and discuss the methodology that will be used. In 
section 3 solution of model will be derived. In section 4, realistic parameter will be applied 
and discussed. In the last section, we summarize the main results. 
 
Section 2: Model description 
Three assumptions are given for the model: 
1.  There is an initial investment cost for the high capital PA investment and no further 
variable cost. This means that the gross revenue is the profit.   
2.  There is a duopoly market, with one leader and one follower, competing for the new PA 
service market 
3.  Before  entering  a  new  PA  service  market,  the  demand  for  the  new  PA  service  is 
unobservable for the leader. But once the initial development occurs, the true product 
demand is revealed and observable to the follower. 
4.  All firms are risk-neutral 
 
The two uncertainties that associate with agribusiness firms’ high capital PA investment 
decision are demand uncertainty from small farmers and new technique arrival uncertainty. 
Unpredictable market situation and farmers’ different taste as well as preference cause the demand for certain PA techniques has dynamic  change over time. The  arriving of new 
technique will not only make the old PA investment obsolete, but increase the supply of 
available PA services and therefore drag down the market equilibrium price of PA service. 
Thus the PA technique investment should consider both uncertainties.   
 
Last paragraph explain agribusiness firms, no matter the leader or the follower, both face 
demand uncertainty.    The assumption 3, however, specifies that the demand for the new 
PA  service  is  only  unobservable  for  the  leader.  The  follower  can  always  observe  the 
demand level after the initial development established by leader. Since the leader faces an 
unobservable market, the demand for the new PA service can only be estimated with error. 
Therefore leader has different demand function from the follower. 
 
The inverse demand function for the follower can be expressed as 
P = X D(Q(N, T))   
This is a  multiplicative form  of inverse demand  function. The  equilibrium  price  of  PA 
service P is determined by product of two factors, X and D. X is the true demand shock 
from the market, which is assumed to follow a Log-normal process. D(.) denotes technique 
induced uncertainty and follows a lognormal stochastic process。N denotes the number of 
firm in the market. T denotes the current available techniques. 
Let D1 = D(Q(1,T) Where there is one firm case 
      D2 = D(Q(2,t), where there is two firms case 
   and                                                                                                   
 
                                                                                                     
                                                                                                     
 
Let P1= XD1 
      P2 = XD2 
According Ito’s lemma, the dynamic of P1 and P2 is as followed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
                                                                                                                                                           
Where  1 ρ   is the correlation between X and D1, and  2 ρ   is the correlation between X and 
D2. Assume the X and D1 , X and D2are independent, thus  1 ρ   and  2 ρ   are both zero. 
 




l P   denote the leader’s investment threshold level and 
*
2
f P denotes the follower’s 
threshold investment level. 
 
For the game-theoretical situation with two firms, equilibrium is determined by backward 
induction. And for the comparison purpose, the noiseless market case will be analyzed first. 
 
Investment by follower in the noise/non-noise market 
It will be no difference for the follower in noise market case or noiseless one. Since the 
demand level will still be fully revealed by the leader to the follower in the noise market. 
The follower can always observe the full-information demand term X(t). Thus the demand 
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P = XD(Q(N,T))= XD2 
 
Assume  the  cost  of  PA  investment  is  K  for  both  companies  and  the  investment  is 
irreversible. Conditional on that lead investment has occurred, the follower hold the option 
on the investment of the second project. Give then demand function faced by the follower, 
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δ is depreciating rate 
 
Since the X and D2 are independent, thus   
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The follower’s value function is as following: 
 
 







f P P ≥ , the follow on investment will occurred, and investment value is equal to 
expected  value  less  the  sunk  investment  cost.  When
*
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βproprietary investment option on the second development project. 
 
Investment by leader when demand is fully observable (noiseless market) 
P(t) has dynamic changes over time. If P(0) < 
*
2
f P   and P(t) 
*
2
f P ≥   at some time t > 0, the 
leader will already have made the investment. If P(t) < 
*
2
f P , the follower will wait and the 




f P for some t >0, the follow-on investment will occur, and the leader will share 
the market profit with the follower and thus they has the same current value. The leader’s 
asset value can therefore be written as: 
                                                                                                                 




From Maskin and Tirole (1997) and Vives (1999) papers, we can infer that a symmetric 
perfect Markov equilibrium obtains when   
 
That is, conditional on competitors are identical, agents are indifferent between leading and 
following at the time lead investment occurs in equilibrium. 
 
Equating  value  function  for  both  leader  and  follower  will  get  the  dealer’s  critical 
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l P   can be determined implicitly. 
 
Investment by leader when demand is not fully observable (noise market) 
The  follower’s  investment  threshold  level  in  noise  market  will  stay  the  same  as  the 
noiseless case. The leader, however, can only observe the noise-involved market value Z(t). 
But  the  leader  will  use  the  best  estimate  of  true  value,  M(t),  to  make  the  investment 
decision. 
The demand function the leader used for decision is: 
P  = MD(Q(N,T))   
At  lead  threshold,  competitors  will  be  different  between  leading  and  following  in  an 
expected value rather than a deterministic value in equilibrium. That is, the competitors will 
equalize  the  conditional  expected  values  of  their  payoffs  that  result  from  pioneering 
investment. 
 
If both the leader’s and follower’s value function (1) and (2) is written as expected value, 
the perfect Markov equilibrium obtains when 
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Where g(P(t)/I(t)) denotes the probability distribution of the unobserved true value P(t), 
conditional on the information available at that time, I(t). And 
*
2
f P   is  critical  since  if  the  revealed  P  is  at  or  above  it,  the  follower  invests 
immediately, and if revealed P is below the it, the follower refrains from investment and 
holds a call option with exercise price K.   
 
Let  M(t)  =  E[X(t)/I(t)]  represent  the  expected  value  conditional  on  the  available 
information. 
)] ( / ) ( [ ) ( t I t X Var t = γ   represents the variance of the estimated value around the true value. 
 
And denote  P= MD 
 
The COR paper (Childs,P.S.,S.H, Ott and T.J.Riddiough.2002) proved that: 
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Follow the similar logic, we can proof that:   
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The symmetric perfect Markov equilibrium 
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(The proof will be provided upon request) 
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l   is a function of time, which result from that  ) (t γ is in general time dependent.   
 
The special cases of  ∞ → k   and  0 = k will illustrate the properties of the lead investment 
boundary. As  ∞ → k , the observed value, Z(t), reverts to the true value X(t). this implies 
the  residual  variance  0 ) ( → t γ for  all  t,  the  expected  threshold  relation  in  equation  (4) 
reduce to the certainty relation in equation (3). As  0 = k , noise accumulates at the rate of 
2 2
Y σ ρ .  In  this  case,  ) (t γ   will  increase  over  time  t  and  the  lead  investment  threshold 
become higher. This follows because accumulating noise increase the probability of making 
an exercise error, which creates the incentive to further delay lead investment and pump up 
the lead threshold. 
 
Section 4.Application and discussion 
To  analyze  the  characteristic  of  the  lead  investment  threshold,  ) (
*
t P
l ,  in  great  detail. 
Realistic parameter values for each variable are used to exam how and in what degree the 
lead and follow-on investment threshold will be affected. 
Assume there are three incentive polices existing to encourage the adoption of high capital 
precision  agriculture  techniques  and  each  of  them  will  affect  certain  parameters  in  the 
model. Different policies’ effect on the lead and follow-on investment threshold will be check and compared respectively.   
The first policy is to provide the agribusiness firms lump-sum subsidy for investing the PA 
equipment and therefore decrease the initial capital cost K.   
The second policy is to help the agribusiness firms to do market research and reduce the 
noise  level  in  the  new  market.  This  policy  will  help  to  reduce  the  initial  noise  level 
0 y σ (segmazero) and increase the noise dissipate rate (k) in the market. 
The third policy is to invest on the research and development of new PA technique. This 
policy will increase the supply of PA service in the market and therefore decrease the price 
of PA service, which makes the drift value, 2 D   , of dynamic D2 have bigger absolute value, 
The parameters applied in the model are 
01 . 0 − = X   , 01 . 0 2 − = D   , X σ =0.1,  1 . 0 2 = D σ , 
0 y σ =0.1,    r = 0.06,  5 . 0 = k  
K=10 
 
Each of the policy is analyzed in the following 
Policy one : Lump-sum subsidy 
Lump-sum subsidy for agribusiness firms make their initial investment costs K go down. 
Figure  1:  lead  investment threshold  as  a  function  of  noise  volatility-segam-y( y σ )  with 




































 Figure  2:  lead  investment threshold  as  a  function  of  noise  volatility-segam-y( y σ )  with 







































Figure  3:  follow-on  investment threshold  as  a  function  of  noise  volatility-segam-y( y σ ) 










































Figure  4:  follow-on  investment threshold  as  a  function  of  noise  volatility-segam-y( y σ ) 










































Discussion: Following figures show the lead threshold level increase as the noise volatility 
segam-y  ( y σ )  increase.  This  follows  because  increasing  noise  volatility  increases  the 
probability of making exercise investment option error and therefore creates the incentive 
for the leader to delay and pump up the threshold level. 
Comparing figure 1 and figure 2, we find that the decrease of initial capital from K=10 to 
K=6 will dramatically drag down the lead threshold level by the same degree. And lead 
threshold does increase as the noise volatility  y σ   increase. 
Comparing figure 3 and figure 4, we find that the decrease of initial capital from K=10 to 
K=6 will decrease the follow-on threshold level from 1.03 to 0.62. And follow-on threshold 
is not affected as the noise volatility  y σ   increase. 
Comparing figure 1 and figure 3, figure 2 and figure 4, we find the lead threshold is much 
higher  than  the  follow-on  threshold.  It  is  mainly  because  the  lead  faces  not  only 
uncertainties but also noise in the brand new market. The information generated by the 
leader’s investment is a public good and will be fully revealed to the follower. Therefore it 
creates a powerful incentives for delay and much higher lead threshold. 
 
Policy two: conduct market research to reduce the market noise 
 
Reducing market noise can be achieve either by increasing the noise dissipation rate k or 
decreasing the initial noise level segam-y( y σ ). 
Figure  5:  lead  investment threshold  as  a  function  of  noise  volatility-segam-y( y σ )  with 

































Discussion: Figure 5 shows that increase in the dissipate rate of noise only slightly decrease 
the lead threshold. This follows because the noise only exists in the demand uncertainty, not 
in new technique uncertainty. Percentage wise, the change of the noise dissipate rate will 
much less effect on the lead threshold. 
 
Figure  6:  lead  investment threshold  as  a  function  of  noise  volatility-segam-y( y σ )  with 
initial noise level segmazero (
0 y σ ) = 0.1 and segmazero (






































Discussion: Figure 6 shows that decrease in the initial noise in the market only slightly 
decrease  the  lead  threshold.  This  follows  because  the  noise  only  exists  in  the  demand 
uncertainty, not in new technique uncertainty. Percentage wise, the change of the noise dissipate rate will much less effect on the lead threshold. 
And because the follower always has the full information of market demand, the reduction 
in noise level has no effect on follower’s threshold level.   
 
Policy three: investing on R&D of PA technique 
The faster the PA technique improve, the faster the PA service price  goes down in the 
market, which implies higher absolute value of  2 D   . 
Figure  7:  lead  investment threshold  as  a  function  of  noise  volatility-segam-y( y σ )  with 








































Figure  8:  lead  investment threshold  as  a  function  of  noise  volatility-segam-y( y σ )  with 





































 Figure  9:  follow-on  investment threshold  as  a  function  of  noise  volatility-segam-y( y σ ) 










































Figure 10: Follow-on investment threshold as a function of noise volatility-segam-y( y σ ) 






































Discussion: for  2 D     goes from -0.01 to -0.05, the lead threshold goes up. The faster the 
new  PA  technique  improves,  the  more  agribusiness  firms  hesitate  to  invest  on  the  PA 
equipment.  It  follows  because  agribusiness  firms  will  be  concerned  that  their  current 
investment will be obsolete under the fast PA technique improvement. Therefore they need 
higher threshold level to justify their PA investment. The same story is for the follow-on 
threshold. The faster the technique changes, the higher the follow-on threshold level. 
  
Section 5: Conclusion 
A game theoretical model is set up for agribusiness firms’ investing on higher capital PA 
equipment. Two uncertainties, demand uncertainty from farmers and new technique arrival 
uncertainty, are identified. The irreversible feature of the investment feature and the noise 
in the new PA service market are taken in account. Three potential incentive policies are 
proposed and analyzed.   
 
Application results show that lump-sum subsidy to the agribusiness firms has the most 
direct and significant effect on dragging down the investment threshold hold for both the 
leader and the follower. Support on market research to decrease the market noise level only 
has a trivial effect on leader’s investment threshold but not follower’s. Support on the R&D 
on  the  new  PA  technique,  on  the  contrary,  pumps  up  both  the  lead  and  the  follow-on 
investment  threshold.  The  concern  about  the  obsolescence  of  their  investment  makes 
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